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Magyar Jeti Zrt v. Hungary: the Court provides legal certainty 
for journalists using hyperlinks 
On 4 December 2018 the European Court of Human Rights ('the Court') found a violation of Article 10 
of the European Convention on Human Rights in Magyar Jeti Zrt v. Hungary. The case concerns the 
imposition of objective liability for posting a hyperlink leading to defamatory content, with the Court 
ultimately deciding that using hyperlinks does not simply equate to acts of dissemination. Instead, it 
requires a case-by-case assessment on the basis of five flexible criteria, resulting in a highly relevant 
and well-rounded judgment.   
Background 
The applicant in the present case is Magyar Jeti Zrt, a company that operates the Hungarian news 
portal '444.hu'. It had published an article about an incident at a Roma school, whereby a group of 
drunk passers-by had thrown beer bottles and shouted insults and threats to the children (§7). 
Afterward, local Roma leader Mr. Gy gave an interview in which he accused the political party Jobbik 
of the incident. The 444.hu article on the events did not refer to Mr. Gy's accusations in any way, but 
read: "A phone conversation with [local Roma leader] Mr. Gy and a parent has already been 
uploaded to Youtube” (emphasis added). The words "uploaded to YouTube" were green-coloured 
(compared to the black text of the rest) and had been activated to be a hyperlink (§9).  
According to dictionary Merriam-Webster, a hyperlink is "[a]n electronic link providing direct access 
from one distinctively marked place in a hypertext or hypermedia document to another in the same 
or a different document". If a reader clicked on the green words, their browser was routed to the 
interview in question, where Mr. Gy made his accusation. The political party found fault with this 
statement and started legal proceedings. Not only Mr. Gy, but also media websites including Magyar 
Jeti Zrt were brought before the courts on the ground that they had disseminated a defamatory 
statement.    
National proceedings 
The first domestic court confronted with the case was the Hungarian High Court. It sided with 
Jobbik's claim by finding that the party’s right to reputation was infringed due to Mr. Gy's 
statements, and that the infringement was imputable to the applicant company because of the mere 
"publication and dissemination of a falsehood that pertains to another person" (§14). The applicant's 
arguments – the company claimed that it had not repeated the interview's statements, nor 
disseminated any falsehoods – were not taken into consideration, until the Debrecan Court of Appeal 
treated the case. Although it upheld the High Court's judgment, it addressed the applicant's 
arguments by stating that 
making a false statement available through a link, even without identifying with it, qualifies as the 
dissemination of facts. Dissemination (or circulation) is the sharing of a piece of news as a content of 
thought and making it available for others. Contrary to [the applicant's] viewpoint expressed in its 
appeal, the infringement of law by dissemination occurs even if the disseminator does not identify 
with the statement, and even if their trust in the veracity of the statement is ungrounded (§16). 
The applicant was thus held objectively liable for disseminating defamatory statements, with which 
the Hungarian Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court (the Kúria) agreed. The latter reasoned 
that 
dissemination is carried out by sharing or making public any information, as a result of which anyone 
can have access to the given content. […] Internet link to one’s own publication serves an appendix; it 
becomes accessible and readable with a single click. The Civil Code established objective responsibility 
for the dissemination, irrespective of the good or bad faith of the disseminator. In the Kúria’s view, 
requiring media outlets not to make injurious statements accessible does not constitute a restriction 
of freedom of the press or freedom of expression […] (§19). 
Judgment of the EctHR 
The Court commences its analysis by investigating whether hyperlinks can be equated to 'acts of 
dissemination'. It concludes that four crucial characteristics of hyperlinks result in a differentiation: 
1. Hyperlinks have a navigational function. They "allow internet-users to navigate to and from 
material in a network characterised by the availability of an immense amount of information" 
(§73). 
2. Hyperlinks are referencing tools. They "do not present the linked statements to the audience 
or communicate its content, but only serve to call readers’ attention to the existence of 
material on another website" (§74). 
3. Hyperlink providers do not control the content. An author who posts a hyperlink "does not 
exercise control over the content of the website to which a hyperlink enables access, and 
which might be changed after the creation of the link" (§75). 
4. Finally, hyperlinks do not create new content. The Courts points out that "the content 
behind the hyperlink has already been made available by the initial publisher […] providing 
unrestricted access to the public" (§75).  
Due to the aforementioned reasons, using hyperlinks does not automatically amount to the 
dissemination of defamatory information. Liability must therefore also be assessed differently, with 
the Court requiring individual assessments and positing five "relevant aspects" that should be taken 
into account to conclude whether liability should be imposed for the use of a hyperlink (§77): 
1. Did the journalist endorse the impugned content? 
2. Did the journalist repeat the impugned content (without endorsing it)? 
3. Did the journalist merely put a hyperlink to the impugned content (without endorsing or 
repeating it)? 
4. Did the journalist know or could reasonably have known that the impugned content was 
defamatory or otherwise unlawful? 
5. Did the journalist act in good faith, respect the ethics of journalism and perform the due 
diligence expected in responsible journalism? 
Importantly, the Court clarifies that the assessment of (reasonable) knowledge under criteria 4 "must 
be determined in the light of the situation as it presented itself to the author at the material time, 
rather than with the benefit of hindsight on the basis of the findings of the domestic courts’ 
judgments" (§81), providing a strong default protection for journalists. However, the Court also 
builds in a failsafe mechanism by recognising that liability is possible where a journalist "does not act 
in good faith in accordance with the ethics of journalism and with the diligence expected in 
responsible journalism dealing with a matter of public interest," even if he or she merely repeats a 
statement (§80).  
By subjecting the case to the aforementioned five criteria, as well as taking into account the chilling 
effect that the imposition of objective liability could entail (§83) and the fact that the domestic courts 
never considered the applicant's rights under article 10, nor conducted a balancing exercise between 
article 10 and article 8 (§83), the Court unanimously concludes that article 10 has been violated. 
Separate opinion 
In his concurring opinion, judge Pinto De Albuquerque does not criticise the Court's judgment, but 
rather provides insight into its reasoning. His opinion emphasises the inspiration taken from the 
third-party intervention submission by advocacy group Article 19. The group emphasised court cases 
and other sources positing a permissive view of hyperlinks, such as the US case Philadelphia 
Newspapers and the landmark Supreme Court of Canada case Crookes v. Newton. In fact, the 
judgment goes quite far in following Article 19's submissions: the four differences between 
hyperlinks and acts of dissemination are based on paragraphs 8 through 20 of Article 19's 
submission; the objective standards in §77 of the judgment reflect paragraphs 25 through 28 of the 
submission; and the exception to allow for a hyperlink publisher's liability is based on paragraphs 21 
and 22. This far-reaching adoption of the organisation's viewpoints might be a result of the backlash 
that the Court faced after its judgment in the Mouvement Raëlien Suisse case (which also concerned 
hyperlinks; see infra). 
Most valuably, he uncovers the reasoning behind the five criteria to assess liability, stating that the 
Court set out to exhaustively describe "the objective and subjective criteria for assessing all possible 
scenarios involving the use of hyperlinks by journalists" (§9). To achieve this, three types of conduct 
are taken into account: 
1. hyperlinking with endorsement of the referred-to content;  
2. hyperlinks with repetition of the content to which they lead;  
3. mere hyperlinking. 
They are combined with three types of subjective standard: 
1. good faith;  
2. knowledge that the referenced content is defamatory or otherwise unlawful;  
3. constructive knowledge that it could be so (§10-§11).  
He also emphasises that journalists' hyperlink obligations concerning good faith, professional ethics 
and due diligence are "obligations of means and not of result" (§14). 
Comment 
The Magyar Jeti Zrt judgment presents an interesting legal situation: that of vicarious or imputed 
liability for hyperlinking to online content. The concept of vicarious liability exists in almost every 
legal system and pertains to the situation whereby a 'superior' (usually an employer) is held liable for 
certain actions by someone under his or her 'supervision' (usually an employee). The present case, 
however, asks whether it is fair to find someone objectively liable for referring to online content over 
which they have no control and that is only afterwards declared as 'unlawful'. The Court's answer is 
no: such an imposition of objective liability could cause a chilling effect (§83), while installing a 
"general requirement for journalists systematically and formally to distance themselves from the 
content of a quotation […] is not reconcilable with the press’s role of providing information" (§80).  
Missing in the Court's reasoning, however, is an elaboration on the degree of 'control' (or 
supervision) necessary to impose vicarious liability, resulting in some legal uncertainty. The only 
mention is found in criteria 3, where the Court states that providers of hyperlinks do not have control 
over the content and subsequent changes of the linked content, "a natural exception being if the 
hyperlink points to contents controlled by the same person" (§75). Judge Pinto De Albuquerque does 
not elaborate on this brief statement in his concurring opinion either (§6). This comes across as a 
missed opportunity, since the joint dissenting opinion of Judges Sajó, Lazarova Trajkovska and Vučinić 
in the 2012 case Mouvement Raëlien Suisse (see infra for a more extensive discussion) does 
elaborate on the scope of control needed. The judges devote almost an entire page to this element 
and ultimately suggest the high threshold of a 'clear, convincingly established demonstration of 
control' to allow vicarious liability where online content is concerned – a stark contrast to the Court's 
single phrase in Magyar Jeti Zrt. By further exploring the key criterion of control that is necessary to 
trigger vicarious liability, the Court could have made its judgment even more theoretically sound and 
it would have allowed to anticipate a future case concerning composite publications (for example, a 
series of articles on the same topic or follow-up articles, both of which are prevalent in journalism; 
see also the Australian case of Cripps v Vakras.  
In spite of this criticism, the judgment is undoubtedly a massive improvement compared to before. It 
finally offers legal certainty and guidance for journalists, who until now had no criteria to base 
themselves on when deciding whether or not to hyperlink to possibly controversial content. 
Moreover, it grants them a strong default level of protection, enabling them to carry out their job 
without fearing baseless convictions of defamation, while still allowing liability in those exceptional 
cases where journalists truly act in bad faith. Additionally, from the perspective of the Court's case 
law, Magyar Jeti Zrt washes away the bitter aftertaste from the Court's previous judgment 
concerning hyperlinks in the contentious Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v. Switzerland case. There, the 
Court allowed the Swiss authorities to block a company from putting up posters that contained a link 
to its website, since this website in turn linked to a site concerning cloning, which was considered 
content contrary to the Swiss public order. This imposition of vicarious liability was decided in the 
Grand Chamber with 9 votes to 8 and received criticism for being outdated since it did not consider 
modern forms of advertising. In contrast, the Court's decision here shows an understanding of what 
can reasonably expected from authors who refer to other online content and of the important role 
that hyperlinks play on the internet; it should not go lost on you that this very blog post and website 
also relies on hyperlinks to refer to other content. In that way, the Magyar Jeti Zrt judgment truly 
forms the missing link concerning the protection of speech on the internet. 
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